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The issue of foreign terrorist fighters is one of the most pressing issues in this decade. In Syria 
and Iraq alone, there are more than 45,000 foreign fighters,1 many of whom joined terrorist 
organisations such as Daesh.2 Could these fighters have been able to join the conflict had 
governments done enough to stop them?3 In other words, what does international law require 
states to do especially when they have a large number of nationals/residents involved in 
terrorism abroad? Why are states, despite their sophisticated security and border controls, 
failing to control the flow of foreign fighters travelling to join the fight in Iraq/Syria? 4 
Worryingly, some states may knowingly allow residents and nationals to travel to war zones 
and subsequently be involved in terrorism. This might be encouraged by the incentive to 
dispose of ‘homegrown terrorists’.5 
                                                          
1 DUNFORD REAFFIRMS U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO | REUTERS.COM, http://www.reuters.com/video/2017/02/23/dunford-reaffirms-us-commitment-to-
nato?videoId=371179963&videoChannel=1&channelName=Top+News (last visited Feb 24, 2017) 
2 Also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant). Later it was also called IS (Islamic State).  
3 Many reports confirmed that states, including the USA, were not doing enough to stop nationals joining such groups. U.S. FAILS TO STOP FLOW OF FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS TO ISLAMIC STATE: STUDY REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-congress-fighters-idUSKCN0RT1VZ20150929 (last visited Apr 
17, 2016)  
4 FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS TRAVEL 23, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf (last visited Apr 28, 2016) 
See also U.S. VETERAN: GOING TO SYRIA TO FIGHT “LIKE BOOKING FLIGHT TO MIAMI BEACH” THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 
http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/2/us-veteran-going-to-syria-to-fight-like-booking-fl/ (last visited Apr 28, 2016) 
5 EXTREMISTS ALLOWED TO LEAVE UK TO EASE HOME TERROR THREAT, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/12050779/Extremists-
allowed-to-leave-UK-to-ease-home-terror-threat.html (last visited Dec 15, 2015) See also EXTREMISTS “ARE ALLOWED TO LEAVE UK SO THEY DON”T CARRY OUT 
ATTACKS HERE’: COUNTER-TERRORISM OFFICIAL CLAIMS POLICE FACE DILEMMA OVER WHETHER TERRORISTS ARE MORE DANGEROUS “HOME OR AWAY” MAIL 
ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3359631/We-soldiers-streets-London-contain-Paris-style-terror-attack-multiple-gunmen-says-police-
chief.html (last visited Dec 15, 2015) 
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There seems to be a lot of confusion about what is required of a state when some of its nationals 
or residents are involved in terrorism abroad. States are either unaware of the recent legal 
developments in relation to their responsibility in such cases, or are benefiting from the 
vagueness and the lack of clarity about such developments. For example, in Tunisia - which 
has a high number of nationals with Daesh who fear a potential defeat in Iraq - there is a heated 
debate between country leaders on whether or not they should allow these nationals to return 
home after they have been involved in terrorism abroad!6 
Nevertheless, while some states seem to be confused about what should be done, some states 
have been responding to the phenomenon differently. For example, some states considered the 
withdrawal of nationality and/or cancelling passports,7 especially from dual nationality terror 
suspects abroad.8 For example, an Australian teenager was ‘stranded in Syria after his passport 
was cancelled while organising his return, his lawyer says.’9 Nevertheless, such an action could 
result in preventing the terror suspect from abandoning terrorism. Moreover, when the state 
taking such action is party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – as 
well as other conventions requiring the prosecution of such persons – this might prevent the 
state from carrying out its duty to ensure that such a person is prosecuted for terrorism.  
In this article, we shall explore state responsibility in relation to foreign terrorist fighters as far 
as its nationals/residents involved in terrorism abroad are concerned. For the purpose of 
illustration, we chose Iraq as a case study.10 To this, we shall first discuss state responsibility 
in relation to individuals. Subsequently, we shall analyse the contemporary legal regime 
governing state responsibility in relation to nationals/residents committing terrorism abroad. 
Finally, the conclusion should provide a synopsis of the study’s outcome.  
2. State Responsibility and Individuals 
Article 2 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC 
Articles) states that ‘[e]lements of an internationally wrongful act of a State’ require the 
following for a state responsibility to arise: 
‘[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission:  
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and  
                                                          
6 Terrorists returning home to Tunisia, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21715033-unwelcome-
homecoming-terrorists-returning-home-tunisia (last visited Feb 1, 2017) 
7 HOME SECRETARY STRIPS MAN OF UK CITIZENSHIP - FOR THE SECOND TIME THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/12/02/home-secretary-strips-man-of-uk-citizenship-for-the-second-time/ (last visited Apr 17, 2016) See also, 
AUSTRALIAN TEEN OLIVER BRIDGEMAN WHO CLAIMED HE TRAVELLED TO SYRIA TO DO “AID WORK” IS STRANDED AFTER GOVERNMENT CANCELS HIS PASSPORT 
MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3465611/Australian-teen-Oliver-Bridgeman-stranded-Syria-passport-cancelled.html (last visited Feb 29, 
2016) Other countries including the UK are considering such measures. Stripping criminals of their UK passports – even terrorists and sex abusers – is 
dangerous, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/01/stripping-criminals-uk-citizenship-racisrt-sex-abusers-
terrorists-two-classes-citizens (last visited Apr 17, 2016) See also NATIONS TRYING TO STOP THEIR CITIZENS FROM GOING TO MIDDLE EAST TO FIGHT FOR ISIS 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/middleeast/isis-recruits-prompt-laws-against-foreign-fighters.html?_r=0  
8 Sengupta See also, FACT CHECK: HOW DOES AUSTRALIA’S PLAN TO STRIP FOREIGN FIGHTERS OF CITIZENSHIP COMPARE TO OTHER NATIONS? ABC NEWS, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-11/foreign-fighters-citizenship-around-the-world/6498920 (last visited Apr 17, 2016) 
9 Mail Online 
10 This is because there is clear international unanimity that the group (Daesh) fighting the Iraqi army is regarded as a terrorist group. 
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(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.’11 
 
To begin with, negligence of the state can be considered as failure in its duty to take reasonable 
care to avoid breaching its international obligations. This is because it could be considered as 
an unlawful conduct, which gives rise to international responsibility.12 Thus, both acts and 
omissions can be the source of international responsibility if they were in breach of an 
international obligation.13 This responsibility continues as long as negligence continues in 
breach of the rules of international law.14  
 
Furthermore, state responsibility for acts of private individuals is already established. For 
example, if an individual attacks an embassy, even if the act cannot be attributed to the state, 
the state can still be held responsible for such an act.15 
 
Nevertheless, even when there is an attempt to discuss terrorism within the parameters of the 
above article, it will still be limited to the prevalent incomplete scope, which repeatedly fails 
to see that states could be held responsible for a wrongful act abroad through omission. This 
study will discuss such omissions of the state in detail. Firstly, we shall highlight the 
contemporary discussion in relation to acts of individuals who can be described as agents of 
the state. Subsequently, we shall focus on the possibility of considering the state responsible 
for acts committed abroad by individuals who are not agents of the state.  
2.1 Individuals as Agents of the State 
If the individual committing terrorism is an agent of the state, the state can be held responsible, 
as would the individual for the terrorist acts. In this respect, Trapp concluded that ‘when a state 
actively participates in an act of terrorism, … the one act of terrorism may give rise to both 
individual criminal and state responsibility.16’ 
 
In such cases, the state responsibility is clear and many scholars would agree with Trapp that 
both acts and omissions of agents that give rise to terrorism are sources of state responsibility.  
2.2 Individuals Un-commissioned by the State 
When an individual cannot be described as an agent of the state (i.e. un-commissioned by the 
state) in any capacity, there are two scenarios; that either the wrongful act has a link to the 
territory of the state or not. 
                                                          
11 ILC, ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES 34 (2001), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
12 Art. 2 & art. 15 ILC 
13 Article 2 of the ILC and many commentaries establish this fact. See for example, Crawford in his commentary works does. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 82 (United Nations & Crawford ed., Cambridge University Press) 
(2002)     
14 Art. 2, 15 & 39 ILC See also KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 4 (Oxford University Press) (2011) 
15 para 4 ILC at 39 
16 Trapp (n 16)  9–10. 
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2.2.1. Un-commissioned Individuals Committing Acts Interrelated with the Territory of the 
State.  
A state could be held responsible for acts of non-agent persons (private parties) if there is a 
certain link to its territory. This is the case when dealing with wrongful acts committed within 
the state’s controlled territory. As Crawford puts it: 
There is no need for state agents to be the direct perpetrators of the unlawful act. In 
Corfu Channel, Albania was held responsible for the consequences of mine-laying in 
her territorial waters by reason of the Albanian authorities’ knowledge and failure to 
warn of the presence of the mines. In fact (though the court did not say this), the mines 
were laid by Yugoslavia. Similarly, a neutral state may be responsible for allowing 
armed expeditions to be fitted out within its jurisdiction, which subsequently carry out 
belligerent operations against another state… Depending on the obligation in question, 
failure to ensure compliance may be attributed to the state even when the conduct was 
that of private entities.17  
 
Furthermore, in relation to the Corfu Channel case, Crawford explains that it ‘involved a 
finding that Albania was, by reason of its failure to warn of the danger, liable for the 
consequences of mine-laying in its territorial waters even though it had not laid the mines.’18 
The ICJ stressed that:  
In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These 
grave omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania. The Court therefore 
reaches the conclusion that Albania is responsible under international law for the 
explosions which occurred… and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted 
from them, and that there is a duty upon Albania to pay compensation to the United 
Kingdom.19 
 
It is noticeable here that this ICJ ruling leaves no doubt that states can be held responsible for 
omissions.  
 
In the same line, a WTO Appellate Body report in the Canada-Dairy (21.5 II), stressed that: 
Irrespective of the role of private parties... the obligations… remain obligations imposed 
on Canada. It is Canada, and not private parties, which is responsible for ensuring that it 
respects… commitments under the covered agreements… The question is not whether one 
or more individual milk producers, efficient or not, are selling CEM at a price above or 
below their individual costs of production. The issue is whether Canada, on a national basis, 
has respected its WTO obligations.20 
 
States have numerous obligations enshrined in international law requiring them to act to 
counter terrorism while controlling their respective territories. Thus, if a state fails to fulfil 
these obligations and as a result of its failure an individual commits terrorism, then this state is 
                                                          
17 JAMES CRAWFORD & IAN BROWNLIE, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 543 (Oxford University Press Eighth edition) (2012) 
18 Id. at 541 
19 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania), at 23 
20 Canada-Dairy (21.5 II), WTO Doc WT/DS113/AB/RW2, 20 December 2002, para 95 p 26. 
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undoubtedly responsible. This is the case even if this individual was not acting as an agent of 
the state in any capacity. 21  
 
2.2.2. Un-commissioned Individuals Committing Wrongful Acts Unrelated to the Territory of 
the State.  
Clearly, it is established that as far as omissions, which represent breaches of international 
obligations, are concerned states could be held responsible for wrongdoings of individuals. 
However, it is hard to find a comprehensive study where wrongful acts of non-agent individuals 
can be attributed to the state due to omissions of the latter wherever the planning, preparation 
and the execution of such crimes happened. Authors would normally either attribute an act 
(directly or indirectly) to the state, or to find a link between the act and the territory of the state 
for it to be responsible. For example, De Frouville, in his ‘“Catalysis” of international State 
responsibility for conduct of private persons’, discussed the juristic as well as the judicial 
backing for the idea that a state may be responsible for acts of individuals because of breaching 
its own obligations under international law.22 However, he did not discuss this in relation to 
terrorism. Moreover, De Frouville limited his discussion to examples of state responsibility 
within its territory as he discussed the responsibility for attacking foreigners by private 
individuals within the state’s controlled territories. Moreover, he thinks that such attribution of 
responsibility was not included in the ILC articles on state responsibility.23  
Similarly, Crawford thinks that there is no need to rely on the ILC articles (e.g art. 8) to 
establish state responsibility for terrorism committed by individuals who are not commissioned 
by the state. He thinks that relying on the law of treaty as well as Security Council (UNSC) 
determinations to prove state responsibility for terrorism committed by individuals would 
suffice.24 Yet, his discussion was fruitful only as far as proving that harbouring or supporting 
terrorism by a state would instigate international responsibility for independent acts of terror 
groups.25 
Nevertheless, the ILC Articles are not useless when it comes to proving state responsibility for 
acts of individuals. For that in the commentary of Chapter II, for example, it is clearly 
established that:   
4) …the different rules of  attribution  stated  in  chapter  II  have  a cumulative  effect,  
such  that  a  State  may  be  responsible for the effects of the conduct of private parties, 
if it failed to  take  necessary  measures  to  prevent  those  effects.  For example, a 
receiving State is not responsible, as such, for the acts of private individuals in seizing 
an embassy, but it will be responsible if it fails to take all necessary steps to protect the 
embassy from seizure, or to regain control over it… In this respect there is often a close 
                                                          
21 TRAPP at 64 citing the ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fourth session, UN Doc. A/8710/Rev.1 (1972), 317.’ and 
‘Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), Merits, 22. See also the ILC’s survey of international law in relation to its work of codification, UN Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 
(1949), 56, para 97, referring to ‘failures to prevent the use of national territory as a base for acts noxious to the legitimate interests of neighbouring States’ as 
one of the central problems of state responsibility calling for elucidation.’ 
22 De Frouville in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 275–280 (J. Crawford et al. ed., Oxford University Press) (2010) 
23 De Frouville in Id. at 107 
24 JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 157–161 (Cambridge University Press) (2013) 
25 Id. at 156–161 
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link between the basis of attribution and the particular obligation said to have been 
breached, even though the two elements are analytically distinct.26 
 
Such determination is what many scholars and jurists failed to link to international acts of 
terrorism. As the previous ILC Articles commentary explains, the state could be held 
responsible for breaching its own obligations in relation to an act of private individuals. There 
is no reason why this should not cover acts of private individuals abroad. This speculation is 
triggered by the recent developments in relation to counter-terrorism state responsibilities. 
Many counter-terrorism conventions and binding UNSC resolutions have emerged after the 
ILC articles. Thus, it could not be rolled out that many of these international obligations, such 
as those under the law of treaty, could provide the basis for state responsibility for wrongful 
acts of individuals abroad.  
 
Next, we shall provide a list of relevant state obligations in relation to counter-terrorism 
responsibilities. In the meantime, we shall highlight the delicate line between failing due 
diligence and fulfilling duties in this regard. The main sources of legal obligations in this field 
are the law of treaties and UNSC resolutions.      
  
3. The law of Treaties: 
To combat the phenomena of terrorism, which represents a threat to international peace and 
security, many conventions were convened. In this article, such conventions will be referred to 
as Counter Terrorism Conventions (CTC). The CTC have been spreading both at international 
and regional levels as follows. 
3.1 International Conventions: 
Among the international CTCs are the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (CPPCIPP)27 
and the 1979 International Convention against Taking Hostages (ICTH).28 In addition, as a 
genuine attempt to counter international terrorism, three important international conventions 
were concluded for this specific purpose: 
 
- 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (ICSTB)29 
- 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT)30 
- 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).31 
 
                                                          
26 para 4 ILC at 39 
27 Annexed to General Assembly resolution 3166 (XVIII) of 14 December 1973. 
Entered into force on 20 February 1977. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, p. 167 
28 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 17 December 1979) 
29 The Convention was adopted by resolution A/RES/52/164 of the General Assembly on 15 December 1997. United Nations,  Treaty Series , vol. 2178, p. 197; 
Resolution A/RES/54/109 https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-9.pdf accessed 19/04/2016. 
30 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999. All state members of the UN have ratified this treaty a 
part from Burundi & Somalia. http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm accessed 25/06/2015. 197 / 39 ILM 270 (2000) / [2002] ATS 23. 
31 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2445, p. 89; A/RES/59/290. http://www.un.org/en/UNSC/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv13.pdf  accessed 25/06/2015.  
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Along with many other international agreements, these three conventions have introduced a body 
of obligations binding upon states in relation to terrorism. This body of obligations is expanding 
as treaties and conventions continue to expand in number while introducing new obligations 
emerging upon states in relation to terrorism. They all oblige states to take all possible measures 
to prevent, suppress, and punish acts of terrorism. Almost every member of the UN ratifies many 
of these conventions. For example, all member states of the UN have ratified the ICSFT apart 
from two (Burundi & Somalia). Thus, the body of obligations established by these agreements 
is undoubtedly an indicator of what international law requires states to do in the face of terrorism. 
3.2 Regional Conventions 
Many important regional arrangements emerged concerning the fight against terrorism. 
Examples are the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ACST);32 the 1971 
OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism (CPPAT);33 the 1977 European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST);34 and the 1999 OAU Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (CPCT).35 
 
It is noteworthy that in most cases the obligations found in regional conventions are similar to 
those found in international conventions.36  
 
There is judicial and jurisprudential agreement that a state is liable if it breaches obligations 
under ratified conventions to which it is a party.37  
 
State obligations stemming from conventions can be a requirement either to act or omit. Thus, 
acts as well as omissions could constitute a breach of international obligation under the law of 
treaties. Furthermore, in the Factory at Chorzów (Jurisdiction), The Permanent Court of Justice 
(PCIJ), held that:  
[i]t is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reoperation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the 
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity 
for this to be stated in the convention itself.38  
In the same case (Indemnity), the court reiterated that:  
[i]t is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of the law, that 
any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation… Reparation 
is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. 39  
                                                          
32 League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terror ism, 22 April 1998, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html [accessed 23 April 2015] 
33 CONVENTION TO PREVENT AND PUNISH ACTS OF TERRORISM TAKING THE FORM OF CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND RELATED EXTORTION THAT ARE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv16-english.pdf (last visited Apr 20, 2016) 
34 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv15-english.pdf (last visited Apr 20, 2016) 
35 OAU CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM, 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_CONVENTION_PREVENTION_COMBATING_TERRORISM.pdf (last visited Jul 30, 2015) 
36 In many cases, even the wordings are identical. For example, the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 and the Arab 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 22 April 1998 have very similar provisions and in many cases they have the same wording.    
37 CRAWFORD & BROWNLIE at 540–56 See also: I. A Shearer, Strake’s International Law, 11th ed. (Delhi: OUP, 2009), 269–73. and Malcolm N. Shaw, International 
Law, Seventh edition (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 566–612. 
38 Permanent Court of International Justice, Chorzow Factory Case, 13 September 1928, (Series A, No. 9, p. 21). 




Thus, it is hard to argue that states cannot be held responsible due to acts of nationals/residents, 
if these acts occur because of the failure of such states to fulfil their contractual obligations. 
With this in mind, next, we shall explain how to establish the responsibility of the state for acts 
of private individuals who are un-commissioned by the state and beyond its territorial control. 
To do this, we shall highlight the main related obligations of the state. 
  
4. Contractual State Counter-Terrorism Obligations under the 
Law of Treaties  
The vast majority of states are parties to most CTC that require them to adopt measures to counter 
terrorism. These obligations include but are not limited to the following: 
4.1. General Requirements   
The objectives of  ICSTB,40 ICSFT,41 and ICSANT42 conventions were uniquely identical as 
they all stressed the need ‘to  enhance  international  cooperation  among  States  in devising  and  
adopting  effective  and practical  measures  for  the prevention  of the acts  of  terrorism, and 
for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators.’ The general objectives in these and in 
most other related conventions are: 
 
A- To ‘enhance international  cooperation  among  States  in devising  and  adopting  
effective  and practical  measures  for  the prevention  of the acts  of  terrorism’; and 
B- To ensure the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of terrorism. 
 
In A above, states have to take a pro-active approach in countering terrorism and cooperating 
with others states (more so affected ones) in every conceivable way to prevent terrorism. There 
is no specific limitation to these requirements. None of the limitations identified by scholars, 
which might prevent responsibility to arise, applies when negligence, omission or lack of 
cooperation on the part of a state party allowed a terrorist act to take place.  
 
Similar provisions are found in other regional conventions. However, some limited their 
objective to that found in point B above. For example, the SAARC Regional Convention on 
Suppression of Terrorism (RCST) took the following as its main aim, which is to: ‘take effective 
measures to ensure that perpetrators of terroristic acts do not escape prosecution and punishment 
by providing for their extradition or prosecution, and to this end.’43 Meanwhile, the Treaty on 
Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
Combating Terrorism (TCSMCIUNSCT) took cooperation, found in point A above, as its main 
objective. 44   
 
                                                          
40 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS, UNITED NATIONS,  TREATY SERIES , VOL. 2178, P. 197; RESOLUTION 
A/RES/54/109, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-9.pdf (last visited Apr 19, 2016) 
41 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, 2178 UNTS 197 / 39 ILM 270 (2000) / [2002] ATS 23. 2, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdf (last visited Apr 19, 2016) 
42 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM. UNITED NATIONS, TREATY SERIES, VOL. 2445, P. 89; A/RES/59/290. 2, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-15.pdf (last visited Apr 19, 2016) 
43 SAARC REGIONAL CONVENTION ON SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Conv18-english.pdf (last visited Apr 21, 2016) 
44 TREATY ON COOPERATION AMONG THE STATES  MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT  STATES IN COMBATING TERRORISM 1, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/csi-english.pdf (last visited Apr 22, 2016) 
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4.2. Obligation to prevent a state’s territories from being used for terrorism 
against others 
Almost all CTC included some provisions requiring states to prevent the usage of their 
respective territories for the purpose of terrorism in any capacity, e.g. Article 7 of the 
ICSANT.45 In fact, in its article 18 the ICSFT46 convention went further to require states parties 
to:  
…cooperate in the prevention of the offences… by taking all practicable measures, inter 
alia, by adapting their domestic legislation… to prevent and counter preparations in 
their respective territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their 
territories, including: 
(a) Measures   to   prohibit   in   their   territories   illegal   activities   of   persons   and 
organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the 
commission of offences set forth…; 
(b) Measures requiring financial institutions and other professions involved in financial 
transactions to utilize the most efficient measures available for the identification of their 
usual or occasional customers, as well as customers in whose interest accounts are 
opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report 
transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity. For this purpose, States 
Parties shall consider: 
(i)... Adopting   regulations   prohibiting   the   opening   of   accounts   the   
holders or beneficiaries of which are unidentified or unidentifiable…; 
…(iii) Adopting  regulations  imposing  on  financial  institutions  the  obligation 
to report promptly  to  the  competent  authorities  all  complex,  unusual  large  
transactions  and unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent 
economic or obviously lawful purpose…; 
(iv) Requiring  financial  institutions  to  maintain,  for  at  least  five  years,  all  
necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international.47 
 
From the above, and as far as the case study is concerned, it is clear that, states are under 
obligation to prevent their respective territories from being used to support terrorism in Iraq in 
any way. This includes to duty to monitor all financial transactions in relation to Iraq. This 
should also be the case in relation to nationals and residents who travel to countries that are 
used by foreign fighters to travel to Iraq. Thus, transactions of nationals/residents who travel 
to related hot zone areas (such as Turkey) 48 for long periods are supposed to be closely 
monitored. A state would be in breach of its treaty obligation if it fails to monitor transactions 
in relation to hot zones. In fact, it may be a breach of conventional obligation if the state learns 
about suspicious transactions and fails to inform the affected state (Iraq in this case). It would 
also be the case if the state of nationality/residency failed to learn about such suspicious 
transactions while it was supposed to know about them in light of its conventional obligations. 
The state of nationality/residency cannot avoid responsibility by merely claiming that it had 
not known about such transactions. It ought to prove that it had been monitoring suspicious 
                                                          
45 at 5 
46 at 10 
47 Id. at 10–11 
48 Turkey is said to have been a main destination for foreign fighters intending to join armed groups in Iraq or Syria. JOE BIDEN APOLOGISED OVER IS REMARKS, 
BUT WAS HE RIGHT? BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-29528482 (last visited May 6, 2016)  
10 
 
transactions in accordance with its international obligations.49 This includes, as mentioned in 
the articles above, using state of the art technological advancements to monitor suspicious or 
unusual transactions.   
 
Regional agreements have also obliged states to take all measures necessary to prevent their 
respective territories from being used for terrorism in any way. For example, The Arab counter-
terrorism agreement ACST in article 3(I) demands that states must take measures to:  
…prevent the use of their territories as a base for planning, organizing, executing, 
attempting or taking part in terrorist crime in any manner whatsoever. This includes the 
prevention of terrorists; infiltration into, or residence in their territories either as 
individuals or groups, receiving or giving refuge to them, training, arming, financing, 
or providing any facilitation to them.50   
   
4.3. Obligation to detect, prevent and suppress terrorism 
Some scholars’ discussing the duty to prevent terrorism have recognised that there were some 
recent changes to the previous point (preventing territories from being used for terrorism). 
However, there is a lack of clear articulation of the recent developments in international law in 
relation to the general requirement of prevention. For example, Trapp stresses that: ‘there have 
been changes to the way in which compliance with terrorism prevention obligations is measured 
in the post-9/11 era.’51 However, Trapp was still reluctant to forfeit the territorial component 
requirement completely. In the sense that even if there was no link to the state’s territory, it may 
still be held responsible. In fact, some might think that Trapp has gone beyond this when he said: 
‘…[a]ttributing a breach of counter-terrorism obligations, whether in the form of a 
failure to diligently prevent, or a failure to extradite or submit to prosecution in good 
faith, raises no particular difficulties. Prevention and aut dedere aut judicare 
obligations, by their nature, call for action on the part of the state organs.’52 
 
Although Trapp discussed state responsibility for acts of private individuals in light of this 
comment, he was still limited to cases where the private individual is used by the state organs 
such as intelligence services. Contrary to what some might believe, Trapp’s theory is limited to 
cases when the state uses private individuals to conduct terrorism activities in order to avoid 
responsibility. Trapp, as did other international lawyers talking about the topic, failed to consider 
failures of state in relation to acts of terrorism committed by private individuals abroad.  
 
Nevertheless, states have a duty to be active in trying to detect, prevent and suppress terrorism. 
For example, article 18 of the ICSFT53 requires all state parties to take numerous effective 
measures to prevent all attempts to support terrorism financially. On the regional level where 
                                                          
49 The purpose of this paper is to highlight the existence of the obligation, which does not require greater depth of analysis for technical subjects like this.  
50 ARAB CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM 3, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html (last visited Jul 30, 2015) 
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many counter-terrorism conventions and agreements are established, states are also bound to do 
everything possible to prevent and suppress terrorism. For example, the OAS CPPAT convention 
required all parties to do everything possible to prevent terrorism. Article 1 of the convention 
clearly states that: ‘contracting states undertake to cooperate among themselves by taking all the 
measures that they may consider effective, under their own laws, and especially those established 
in this convention, to prevent and punish acts of terrorism…’54 
 
In fact, according to many CTC states are required to be proactive and prevent all activities that 
can lead to terrorism including encouraging or instigating terrorism. 55   
 
Meanwhile, article 3 of ACST convention prescribes the following requirements that must be 
fulfilled by the Arab states parties:56  
3. To develop and strengthen systems for the detection of the movement, importation, 
exportation, stockpiling and use of weapons, munitions and explosives and of other 
means of aggression, murder and destruction as well as procedures for monitoring their 
passage through customs and across borders in order to prevent their transfer from one 
Contracting State to another or to third-party States other than for lawful purposes…57  
 
Article 4 of the same convention stresses that: ‘[c]ontracting States shall cooperate for the 
prevention and suppression of terrorist offences…’58 
 
Furthermore, Article 6 of the Gulf Cooperation Council Counter-Terrorism Agreement 
(GCCCTA),59 requires all state parties to, inter alia, prevent the recruitment of nationals for 
terrorism purposes. The contracting states must ‘work towards the prevention of any chance of 
enticing any of its nationals to join any unlawful groups, or involvement in any terror activities 
under any pretext…’60 This is a self-imposed obligation by the state parties to prevent their 
citizens from being recruited by criminal groups, and/or from participating in any terror 
activities, under any pretext.  
Meanwhile, the President of the Iraqi Parliament, Saleem Aljuburi, speaking before the 
parliament about the 2015 events in Anbar in his comments on the events of Anbar on 18th 
April 2015 said:  
…we will not allow the expulsion of Daesh. Instead, we will destroy it so that it will 
not be a virus that moves into our neighbours’, for that we care about the security of the 
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brothers as we do for the security of Iraq. Thus, they should lend similar support both 
direct and indirect... 61   
This determination bears some important connotations, among which that Iraq is vowing to 
fulfil its obligations under international law to prevent and suppress terrorism. Prevention here 
includes preventing terrorists from fleeing into other states, which would endanger their 
security. As the President of the Parliament said, one would expect that other states would also 
do their part to prevent and suppress terrorism in order to help Iraq.  
The test is whether the state of nationality/residence of the individual fighting in Iraq has 
fulfilled all of its requirements under international law in detecting, preventing and suppressing 
terrorism. These requirements are related to terrorism committed by any individual wherever 
that maybe. Thus, if a state has many residents/nationals committing terrorism in Iraq, it could 
be queried whether it had fulfilled its duties under international law to detect, prevent, or 
suppress terrorism committed by such persons. There is no doubt that this duty is not confined 
to state of nationality/residency. However, it is given that the state of nationality/residency is 
practically the most relevant state when it comes to detecting and preventing individuals from 
travelling to join terrorist groups. There is no doubt that the state of nationality/residency is in 
a better position to do so. Thus, failing to exhibit that it has done everything possible to fulfil 
its duties in this regard could give rise to its responsibility under international law for failing 
to detect, prevent and suppress certain terrorist acts.    
 
4.4. Obligation to improve domestic legislations and establish jurisdiction over 
terrorist acts 
Part of the counter-terrorism measures that states must take is to amend domestic legislations to 
establish jurisdiction over terrorist acts. For example, article 5 of the ICSANT62 provides that 
each state party is required to:  
‘(a)…establish as criminal offences under its national law the offences set forth in 
article 2; 
(b)…make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account 
the grave nature of these offences.’63  
 
Equally, article 4 of the ICSFT64 and article 4 of the ICSTB65 both provide similar provisions.66   
 
Articles 7 of the ICSFT67, 6 of the ICSTB68 and 9 of the ICSANT, consistently provide that 
each state party shall:  
                                                          
61 Parliament Website, President of Iraqi Parliament’s Media Office, 18 April 2015. Accessed in 23 Jun 2015. 
http://www.parliament.iq/details.aspx?id=39710&AlwType=Pre 
62 at 5 
63 Id. at 5 
64 at 4 
65 at 4 
66 In fact, even the wordings of these articles are almost identical. The only difference was that in the 2005 convention the word ‘domestic law’ was replaced by 
‘national law’. 
67 at 5 
68 at 5–6 
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1. …take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences set forth …when:  
(c) The offence is committed by a national of that State. 
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) The 
offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the 
territory of that State.69 
 
These two points clearly establish an obligation upon the state to take the burden of prosecuting 
terrorists, partly, because they are nationals or residents of that state. Even if the terrorist act 
was not committed on its territory nor linked to it at any stage of preparation, the state of 
nationality/residency is still responsible for establishing jurisdiction over such individuals.  
The state’s responsibility to ensure prosecutability of terrorists went even beyond the cases 
where the offender is a national or a resident to include those present on its territory after the 
offence was committed in some cases. In fact, Article 9(4) of the ICSANT 70 convention 
requires states ‘to establish its jurisdiction over the offences… in cases where the alleged 
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties 
which have established their jurisdiction in accordance…’71 Thus, it is the responsibility of the 
state to ensure that terrorist acts are prosecutable even if the person present on its territory was 
not classified as a resident or a national before committing the offence.   
Similar, and sometimes identical, provisions are also found in regional CTC. For example, the 
EU ECST convention, in its article 672 requires each state party to take all measures necessary 
including introducing new legislations, to ensure that terrorist offenders are either extradited 
or immediately prosecuted whenever they are present on its territory. Correspondingly, the 
article 6 of 1999 African convention CPCT binds states with similar obligations.73 
 
The above provisions clearly ascertain that the duty of the state party to establish its jurisdiction 
over terrorist acts committed by its nationals/residents (sometimes even by visitors) abroad is 
an international obligation. Therefore, not establishing such jurisdiction would constitute a 
breach of an international legal obligation on the part of the state party in question. An affected 
state may claim that fulfilling such obligations would have prevented the nationals of the failing 
state from joining a terrorist group to start with. It could argue that fulfilling such obligations 
would have deterred some, as they would know that they would face prosecution as soon as 
they return. 
 
In addition, some conventions have obliged states parties to recognise a list of acts as terrorist 
acts. This also obliges states parties to consider them as part of the crimes included in their 
domestic law as soon as the convention is signed. SAARC’s RCST convention, for example, 
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dictates that ‘…conduct constituting any of the following offences, according to the law of the 
Contracting State, shall be regarded as terroristic…’74 
 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth of Independent States in article 4(1) of their CTC agreed that 
‘[i]n cooperating in combating acts of terrorism, including in relation to the extradition of 
persons committing them, the Parties shall not regard the acts involved as other than 
criminal.’75  
 
Therefore, in principle, if Iraq is to submit a claim against any of the states from which nationals 
or residents have joined Daesh claiming that this state has not established jurisdiction over the 
related crimes, this would be a way of holding that state responsible to a certain extent. This is 
especially so if such persons return to that state and it took no measures to prosecute them for 
the crimes they committed in Iraq claiming that it has no jurisdiction over such crimes.     
 
4.5. Obligation to investigate, arrest, prosecute or extradite terrorist suspects.  
Related conventions seem to have a tradition of requiring all states parties to ensure that 
perpetrators of terrorist acts are arrested, prosecuted or extradited as appropriate. Even when the 
state is not willing to extradite such persons, it is under obligation to prosecute them immediately 
and ensure that they receive severe punishments proportionate to the gravity of the crime they 
committed. This applies whether the offender is a national, resident or even a visitor to that state. 
For example, article 10(2) of the ICSANT76 requires the state in which a perpetrator of a terrorist 
act is present to either prosecute or extradite him/her without any delay.  
 
Moreover, article 7(1-2) of the ICSTB convention77 and article 7(4) of the ICSFT convention78 
agree with article 11(1) of the ICSANT convention which provides that:  
[t]he State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall…, if it 
does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether 
or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in 
accordance with the laws of that State. Those  authorities  shall  take  their decision  in  
the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  any  other  offence  of  a  grave nature under the 
law of that State.79  
 
Furthermore, states are under obligation to aid each other and fully cooperate at all stages 
leading to the prosecution of terrorists including exchange of information in relation to 
investigation, arrest, extradition and prosecution. There is no doubt that when at these various 
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stages (investigation, arrest, extradition or prosecution) the support of the state of 
nationality/residency cannot be underestimated.  
 
Lack of cooperation on behalf of the state of residence/nationality is in breach of most CTC. 
For example, similar to article 10(1) of the ICSTB80 and article 12(1) of ICSFT,81 article 14(1) 
of the ICSANT convention dictates that:    
States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection 
with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the 
offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence at their 
disposal necessary for the proceedings.82 
Regional treaties have also included similar provisions. For example, article 7 of the ECST 
convention83 requires the state in which a perpetrator is present to take all necessary measures 
to either extradite or prosecute the offender immediately. Similar provisions are also found in 
the Arab ACST convention in its article 3(II:1) 84  and in article 4(2) (h) of the CPCT 
convention.85 
There is no doubt that the state of nationality/residency is in a strong position (both legally and 
practically) to cooperate. Legally because of the established authority and legal relationship 
with the individual as a national or a resident; and practically because such a state would be in 
a stronger position than other states to provide useful information and intelligence with regards 
to the investigation, arrest, prosecution or extradition operations.  
 
As we have seen above, in some cases states are required to extradite the person whether or not 
s/he has a citizenship or residential status in that state. Thus, states cannot claim that they can 
no longer be held responsible if the national or resident changed nationality or residency status.  
All states on whose territory there is a terrorist returning from Iraq are under obligation to either 
extradite or prosecute them for the terrorist crimes they committed whilst in Iraq.  
 
4.6. Obligation to improve security methods and establish strong databases on 
terrorism 
Most recent CTC emphasise the need for establishing intelligence databases on terrorism. States 
are required to use the advancement of technology to the best possible level to gather information 
related to terrorism and share this information effectively. Such provisions are described in some 
detail in some CTC. For example, article 3 of the Arab convention ACST clearly expects states: 
 
                                                          
80 at 9 
81 at 8 
82 at 9 
83 EU at 95–96 
84 League of Arab States at 4 
85 OAU at 210–11 
16 
 
4. To develop and strengthen systems concerned with surveillance procedures and the 
securing of borders and points of entry overland and by air in order to prevent illicit 
entry thereby…  
7. To reinforce security-related information activities and to coordinate them with those 
of each State … 
8. To establish, in each Contracting State, a database for the accumulation and analysis 
of information relating to terrorist elements, groups, movements and organizations and 
for the monitoring of developments with respect to the terrorist phenomenon and of 
successful experiences in counter terrorism, and to keep such information up to date 
and make it available to the competent authorities of Contracting States…86  
 
In the same line, article 9 of the GCCCTA requires each member of the Gulf Council to 
establish an advanced anti-terror database for terror-related information and cooperation 
between relevant security bodies.87 This treaty gained prominence when it required states to 
invest in the advancement of technology to monitor, conduct surveillance and track terror 
groups and their activities. It requires all state parties to build a database to collect information 
and gather data on terror suspects, terror groups and their members as well as monitoring terror 
activities and tactics and studying the best ways to counter-terrorism. The state parties are 
required to keep track of up-to-date information and pass them to the relevant authorities in 
other state parties for effective control and prevention operations.  
Sometimes conventions went into some details, which are very useful, but at the same time 
increase the burden on states. For example, article 3 (II) of the Arab ACST convention requires 
states to:  
…establish effective cooperation between the relevant agencies and the public in 
countering terrorism by, inter alia, establishing appropriate guarantees and incentives 
to encourage the reporting of terrorist acts, the provision of information to assist in their 
investigation, and cooperation in the arrest of perpetrators.88 
 
Similar provisions are found in other regional conventions, e.g. article 4 (2) (i) of the CPCT 
convention.89 Just as useful as other measures identified in this article, engaging the public can 
be very helpful in detecting and preventing terrorism and in investigating and prosecuting 
terrorism offences. In fact, some might argue that this is one of the most effective tools against 
terrorism. State parties, who fail to do so, should find it hard to claim that they did all that is 
required to prevent their nationals from - eventually - committing acts of terrorism abroad. If 
Iraq was to submit a claim against the state of nationality/residence of a terrorist operating on 
its territory, it could claim that the relevant state had taken no measure to engage the public to 
cooperate. Such an engagement may have been able to warn about the act of terrorism the 
individual in question committed in Iraq pre-emptively. This is especially true as it is 
undeniable that engaging the public has led in many cases to learning about terrorist activities. 
As a counterterrorism intelligence source puts it: [a]bout  70–80  percent  of  our  intelligence  
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comes  from  open sources – those open to the public – such as the newspaper, media, internet, 
public, and community.’90   
Clearly, it is not enough for a state to claim that it had not known about a large number of 
nationals/residents who travelled to Iraq and joined terrorist groups. The state of 
nationality/residence has to prove that it was using all available technological advancements 
and that it was proactively attempting to gather such information. It would also need to prove 
that it was not able to communicate the available information it had in relation to terrorist acts 
committed by nationals/residents abroad.  
Some might argue that the technological advancement available to one state is not the same for 
another. While this might be true, the fair measurement would be to assess the technologies the 
same state uses for its own security and see if it failed to use the same for the security of others. 
For the purpose of illustration, in 2015 the UK traced three of its nationals in Syria and claimed 
that it had known about their plans to launch terrorist attacks in the UK.91 Thus, for example, 
if a claim is to be launched by Iraq against the UK, the latter will have to prove that it had used 
the same level of technology and intelligence it used in this incident to track nationals/residents 
fighting in Iraq and communicate such information to Iraq. Claiming that it had not been able 
to track any would be hard to prove, against the fact that it had been able to do so for its own 
security.   
 
4.7. Obligation to cooperate, exchange information and coordinate action. 
Most CTC include provisions requiring states parties to effectively and promptly communicate 
all available information that can be useful in detecting, preventing, suppressing or prosecuting 
terrorism. For example, article 18 of the ICSFT 92 necessitates that state parties must fully 
cooperate by exchanging relevant information that could help prevent offences outlined in the 
convention. Likewise, article 7 of the ICSANT provides that each state party is required to 
cooperate by: 
 
(b) Exchanging accurate and verified information…, and coordinating   administrative 
and other measures taken…to detect, prevent, suppress and investigate the offences set 
forth in article 2…. In  particular, a  State  Party  shall  take appropriate measures in 
order to inform without delay the other States …in respect of the commission of the 
offences set forth in article 2 as  well  as  preparations  to  commit  such  offences  about  
which  it  has  learned.93 
 
States are therefore clearly required to be proactive in informing other states about possible 
terrorist activities. To start with, not attempting to gather such information would be in violation 
of this article. States must be alert and take the initiative to use intelligence and every possible 
technological advancement to gather the information and then communicate it in an immediate 
manner to states that could benefit from it in preventing, suppressing or prosecuting terrorism. 
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This is because it is in the best position both legally and practically to do so. Clearly, it would 
be in breach of this obligation if, for example, the state claimed that it had not known about 
nationals or residents who were preparing for a terrorist attack abroad, when it should have 
known about such cases. More so, the breach of obligation would be obvious if the state had 
known and did not notify the affected state about it in a timely manner.  
 
The only limitation to the requirement of this article is that explained in paragraph (3) where it 
provides: ‘States Parties  shall  not  be  required  by  this  Convention  to  provide  any information  
which  they  are  not  permitted  to  communicate  pursuant  to  national law  or  which  would  
jeopardize  the  security  of  the  State  concerned  or  the physical protection of nuclear 
material.’94 Yet, in many cases, it would be difficult for the state of nationality/residency to claim 
that this exception applies. For example, when a certain state is aware of a citizen who travelled 
to Iraq for suspicious reasons months ago and is aware of his/her location in Iraq through 
intercepting some of the phone calls he/she made to family and friends, this state must inform 
Iraq about all available information. For example, if such a person is found to be staying in an 
area controlled by terrorist groups,95 this makes it hard for the state to claim that there was no 
link between his/her travel and terrorism, thus making it hard for the state to avoid responsibility 
if it does not pass all relevant information to Iraq.  
 
Regionally, many CTC have expressly required states parties to cooperate and offer all available 
information to the affected state in order to help the latter to suppress terrorism. For example, 
article 8 of the SAARC RCST convention stipulates that:  
1. Contracting States shall, …afford one another the greatest measure of mutual 
assistance in connection with proceedings brought in respect of the offences referred to 
in Article I …including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the 
proceedings. 
2. Contracting States shall cooperate among themselves…through consultations 
between appropriate agencies, exchange of information, intelligence and expertise and 
such other cooperative measures …with a view to prevention of terroristic activities 
through precautionary measures.96 
 
Article 3(2) of the Arab CTC ACST included similar provisions requiring states parties to:97 
‘…cooperate and coordinate action among Contracting States, particularly neighbouring 
countries suffering from similar or common terrorist offences.’98 Meanwhile, article 4 (I:4) 
requires state parties to communicate all information that may:  
a. Assist in the arrest of a person or persons accused of committing a terrorist 
offence against the interests of that State or of being implicated in such 
an offence whether by aiding and abetting, collusion or incitement;  
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b. Lead to the seizure of any weapons, munitions or explosives or any 
devices or funds used or intended for use to commit a terrorist offence.99 
 
It should be noted here that similar provisions are also found in article 5 (1) and (2) of the 1999 
CPCT African Union’s CTC.100 
 
Nevertheless, the provisions in the previous Arab Convention article can be relied upon in 
establishing that every state party has a responsibility to warn the state on which territory a 
terrorist act is about to be carried out by nationals or residents of the former. The affected state 
must be warned about such dangers before those nationals or residents enter its territory if 
possible. As Iraq is party to this convention, all other Arab states bear the responsibility to warn 
Iraq and cooperate with it as soon as they could possibly do so. States from where foreign 
terrorists fighting in Iraq have come are under international legal obligation to warn Iraq in 
advance so that it can take necessary steps to prevent terrorist crimes when possible. If any 
state party fails to do so, it could be held responsible for breaching its obligations. We can see 
that paragraph 3 of article 4(I) clearly requires:   
Contracting States shall undertake to cooperate with each other in the exchange of 
information for the suppression of terrorist offences and promptly to notify other 
Contracting States of all the information or data in their possession that may prevent 
the occurrence of terrorist offences in their territory, against their nationals or residents 
or against their interests.101       
 
Thus, the ACST clearly establishes that the international responsibility of the state in relation 
to its residents, and more pressingly its responsibility in relation to terrorist activities by its 
citizens (nationals) whether residents or living abroad, is inherent. The same articles also 
mentioned a number of obligations upon state parties related to facilitating counter-terrorism 
mechanisms. This can clearly be seen in the provisions of article 3 of the ACST.102 The 
exchange of information is required both before and after the commission of the terror offence. 
The provisions of article 4 of this ACST dictate that:103 
2. Each Contracting State shall undertake to notify any other Contracting State 
in an expeditious manner of the information it has concerning any terrorist 
offence that takes place in its territory and is intended to harm the interests of 
that State or of its nationals and to include in such notification statements 
concerning the circumstances surrounding the offence, those who committed it, 
its victims, the losses occasioned by it and the devices and methods used in its 
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perpetration, to the extent compatible with the requirements of the investigation 
and inquiry.104   
 
Furthermore, article 9 of the GCCCTA clarifies that for the sake of fulfilling the aim of this 
agreement, state-parties are obliged to exchange information and details relating to threats, risks, 
probabilities and anticipations related to terror crimes. Furthermore, states have the obligation 
to report about members of terror groups or persons suspected to have been in contact with such 
members. The article also requires the exchange of information in an immediate manner about 
any terror activities directed against a state-party whether inside their territories or beyond, and 
all investigation results as well as the identity of the suspects must be communicated. Immediate 
exchange of all information related to tactics and tools used by terrorists and methods used to 
counter them as well as all information and expertise used in counter-terrorism should be 
exchanged.105  
 
There is no doubt that states parties to the above conventions must have both established a 
database and have been collecting information, and that they have been cooperating consistently 
in the manner prescribed in these documents. Therefore, the state party whose citizens or 
residents have been fighting in Iraq for the months and years is assumed to have gathered (at 
least) some information in relation to these citizens. The minimum requirement (as per the other 
conventions above) is for these states to communicate with Iraq and pass all available 
information to the Iraqi authorities so that counter-terror operations can benefit from such 
information. For example, Saudi Arabia is said to have a large percentage of Daesh fighters as 
its citizens.106 Therefore, it is incumbent upon it to cooperate with Iraq by exchanging all 
information that can help Iraq in counter-terrorism operations.  
 
The treaties studied above clearly identify the responsibility of the state party in relation to its 
nationals and residents when they are involved in terror activities in another state’s territory. The 
related provisions of these treaties must be understood in light of the fact that today’s technology 
advancement made it easy for states to keep track of nationals and residents wherever they move 
and whenever they are involved in suspicious criminal activities. 
 
Breaching any of the obligations above would give rise to state responsibility due to a breach of 
contractual obligation. Under international law, this is enough of a source of obligation and such 
breaches are enough of a source of state responsibility towards those affected. There is no need 
for further proof, yet the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) acting under Chapter VII 
produced many binding resolutions reinforcing the above obligations, as we shall see next.  
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5. Security Council Resolutions: 
The UNSC treated terrorism as a major threat to world peace and security.107 Thus, and as the problem 
of terrorism is not shrinking, the UNSC continues to produce various solutions on this matter. The 
UNSC resolutions are vital as they reinforce established state obligations and create new obligations 
incumbent upon all states to counter terrorism at the same time. While the law of treaties in most cases 
binds states parties only, the UNSC resolutions in relation to terrorism are usually issued under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, all UN member states are bound by such resolutions.  
The UNSC produced vital decisions such as Res 1371 (26th Sep 2001)108 and Res 1566 (2004).109 
Noticeably, some recent resolutions have focused on the phenomenon of foreign fighters. For example, 
in Res 1373 the UNSC required all states to: 
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons 
involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups 
and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists; 
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision 
of early warning to other States by exchange of information; 
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide 
safe havens; 
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their 
respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens; 
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, 
in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious 
criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the 
seriousness of such terrorist acts; 
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, 
including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings; 
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and 
controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for 
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;110 
In all clarity, the UNSC in this resolution reinforces the counter-terrorism state obligations enshrined 
in the law of treaty, as demonstrated above. In addition, this resolution emphases a specific duty to 
prevent foreign fighters from travelling for terrorism purposes.  
Clearly, the said resolution requires states to carry out a two-stage operation of prevention and 
deterrence. For example, states whose nationals/residents are fighting in Iraq have the duty to use every 
possible method to track, trace and gather information about their subjects and to communicate such 
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information to the affected state(s), Iraq in this case. In fact, the state of nationality/residency should 
prevent the travel of suspected terrorists to prevent them from joining terrorist groups. Fortunately, 
some states have already started to do so.111 The state should do everything possible to know the 
intention of such people and prevent them before travelling. In cases where the prevention was not 
possible, the national/residence state should help Iraq to bring those who have been fighting there 
alongside terrorist groups to justice. If such persons return to their state of nationality/residence, the 
latter is under obligation to either prosecute these criminals or extradite them to the affected states so 
that they can face justice. 
Interestingly, the 1373 Res also required all states to ‘`[b]ecome parties as soon as possible to the 
relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999’.112 The UNSC also 
held this view in its 1624 Res (2005) in which it was: 
Stressing its call upon all States to become party, as a matter of urgency, to the international 
counter-terrorism Conventions and Protocols whether or not they are party to regional 
Conventions on the matter, and to consider signing the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly on 13 April 2005.113 
It is unusual to say the least for the UNSC to require states to become party (as a matter of urgency) to 
such conventions.114  
These UNSC’s binding resolutions require all states to prevent terrorist activities whether committed 
by nationals or foreigners regardless of whether committed on national territories or abroad. This 
requirement could lead to establishing state responsibility for all terrorist activities planned/carried out 
by nationals or residents at home and abroad. States should not be able/allowed to easily rely on simple 
claims such as lack of knowledge, lack of fellowship/connection or lack of causation to escape the 
responsibility for acts of terrorism carried out by nationals abroad, so long as these nationals still hold 
its nationality whilst committing the terrorist activity. This is because the international responsibility of 
the state is determined at the time of carrying out the action not after or before it.115 Therefore, claiming 
that the nationality of a terrorist has been dropped should not allow the state to escape the responsibility. 
In such case, this state would have failed its responsibility twice, firstly because of its failure to fulfil 
its due diligence duty to prevent terror acts committed by this national, and secondly because of its 
failure to cooperate internationally among the state of origin, state of transit and the state of destination, 
a requirement under UNSC Res 2178 (2014).116 Acting under chapter VII, the UNSC in this resolution 
requires all states to: 
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11. …improve   international,   regional,   and sub regional cooperation…to  prevent  the travel 
of foreign terrorist fighters from or through their territories, including through increased  
sharing  of  information  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  foreign  terrorist fighters,  the  sharing  
and  adoption  of  best  practices,  and  improved  understanding  of the  patterns  of  travel  by  
foreign  terrorist  fighters,  and  for  Member  States  to  act cooperatively  when  taking  national  
measures  to  prevent  terrorists  from  exploiting technology,  communications  and  resources  
to  incite  support  for  terrorist  acts…117 
Furthermore, Res 1373 required all states to launch an up-to-the-level-of-threat campaign to improve 
its capabilities in legal and security fields to counter terrorism. Among the steps required by the 
resolution is the freezing of funds of all persons involved in terror activities.118  
Thus, the UNSC clearly engages all Members States and requires them to act swiftly, cooperatively and 
sturdily to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters. This said, it is evident that states are primarily 
responsible for the travel of nationals and residents as they have the best legal and practical capabilities 
to fulfil the said duty in comparison to other states. The state is naturally more capable of learning about 
the intentions of nationals/residents travelling to join terrorism than any other state. In fact, acting under 
Chapter VII as well, the UNSC bluntly mentioned residency and nationality states as key stakeholders 
who must cooperate in order to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters. The UNSC in Res 
2178 (13) clearly affirms that it:  
3.  Urges Member States…to intensify   and   accelerate   the   exchange   of   operational   
information   regarding actions  or movements  of  terrorists  or  terrorist  networks,  including  
foreign  terrorist fighters, especially  with  their  States  of  residence  or  nationality…119  
The positive cooperation duty required from states by the latter resolution, clearly necessitates proper 
control of borders to check on ‘foreign fighters’ (as described by UNSC resolutions) to check their 
identities and travel documents and prevent and suppress recruiting, organising, training or transporting 
persons who travel to countries other than those whom they are nationals of or residents in to, organise, 
prepare for, finance or carry out terror activities. The resolution also reiterated the need for all member 
states to ensure that their legislations are capable of holding terrorists accountable, and that states are 
required to have effective judicial systems in place to ensure that terrorists are held accountable.  
In light of the body of rules clearly embodied in many UNSC resolutions issued under chapter VII, it is 
hard to say that any state can merely claim that terror activities carried out by nationals or residents 
abroad are nothing to do with it. In fact, only when the state had done everything possible and fulfilled 
its responsibilities under international law to cooperate and do everything possible to prevent, suppress 
and punish terrorism, it can then claim that it cannot be claimed against.   
6. Conclusion 
There is no doubt of the fact that breaching international obligations by a state would give rise to state 
responsibility. It is also given that breaching obligations under conventions ratified by a state will give 
rise to such responsibility. The same applies to breaches of obligations stemming from Chapter VII 
based UNSC Resolutions. Consequently, as it has been explained in this article, states are under 
obligation to do everything possible to detect, prevent, suppress and prosecute terrorism regardless of 
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who, where and when. We have explained that under contemporary international law states have 
specific obligations in fighting terrorism. For example, states have obligations to establish a strong 
database and to communicate relevant information with relevant states effectively and promptly to 
ensure that terrorism is detected, prevented, suppressed or prosecuted whenever it is possible to do so. 
We have also highlighted the fact that in fulfilling its duty the state has to be pro-active and use the best 
available methods, techniques and technologies to counter terrorism. These state obligations are 
required in the face of all terrorism regardless of who commits it. However, as we have demonstrated, 
it is more pressing for states of nationality and residency to carry out such duties as they are in better 
legal and practical positions. Therefore, failing to fulfil any of the counter-terrorism obligations under 
international law, could give rise to state responsibility for acts of terrorism committed by nationals and 
residents abroad. This is true, even if they were not agents of the state in any capacity and even if the 
act has no connection whatsoever to the territory of the state of nationality/residence.  
All obligations mentioned in this work apply to all states, even to the few that might not have joined 
the conventions above. This is because the UNSC has indeed reinforced every single law of treaties 
obligation in this regard. This was done while acting under Chapter VII which makes it incumbent upon 
all UN member states to abide by.  
As for the case study, it is clear that Iraq could request clarifications from the states who have nationals 
or residents fighting terror wars on its territory. The states of nationality/residence would then have to 
prove that they have done everything possible to cooperate and to fulfil their obligations under 
international law to be relieved from responsibility. The test involved is that of due diligence and 
proving that all possible efforts have been made to cooperate with Iraq. Otherwise, the states of 
nationality/residence of foreign terrorist fighters could find themselves in a position where they would 
have to deal with the consequences of their intentional or unintentional negligence towards Iraq, for 
which they could be held responsible under contemporary international law. 
It could be argued that there are many cases in which it would be difficult to determine whether the 
state should be held responsible even if it fails to fulfil its duties under the law of treaties, e.g. if the 
country is being controlled by powerful militias who disallow the state from carrying out its duties in 
preventing terrorism. Nevertheless, the purpose of this article is to prove that it is possible to hold states 
responsible for such failure. More research will need to be done to counterpart this work once it has 
been published. 
 
 
 
 
